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Abstract 
 
One of the challenges of any adaptive system is to ensure that users can understand how and why the behaviour of the 
system changes at runtime. This is particularly important for adaptive security behaviours which are essential for 
applications that are used in many different contexts, such as those hosted in the cloud. In this paper, we propose an 
approach for using traceability information, enriched with causality relations and contextual attributes of the deployment 
environment, when providing feedback to the users. We demonstrate, using a cloud storage-as-a-service environment, how 
our approach provides users of cloud applications better information, explanations and assurances about the security 
decisions made by the system. This enables the user to understand why a certain security adaptation has occurred, how the 
adaptation is related to current context of use of the application, and a guarantee that the application still satisfies its 
security requirements after an adaptation. 
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1. Introduction 
Many software applications are now deployed as 
Cloud Services in order to allow users to access them 
from a variety of devices, wherever they happen to be.  
This requires that these applications be able to adapt their 
behaviour, in order to ensure that requirements continue 
to be satisfied even when the context of use changes.  
This is particularly important for critical quality 
requirements such as security requirements. 
For example we may want a cloud application to 
change its security behaviour depending on where 
(location) it is used, who (subject) is using it, or when 
(time) it is being used. We call this Adaptive Information 
Security (AIS). As a result of dynamic context, the assets, 
their values, and attack scenarios can change easily from 
one situation to another, increasing the challenge of 
finding out what the information assets are, who their 
owners are, where in the system vulnerabilities lie, and 
the extent to which the security requirements are satisfied. 
One of the challenges of any adaptive security system 
is to ensure that users can understand how and why the 
security behaviour of the system changes at runtime. For 
example, a doctor may be able to edit a medical record 
stored on a cloud server using one device but only able to 
read the same medical record when it is accessed from a 
different device. This is because an access control policy 
for maintaining confidentiality and integrity of medical 
records may dictate that the doctor is able to gain access 
to edit rights only when he is on duty. Sensors in the 
device used when accessing a record determine the 
contextual property of whether the doctor is on duty. As a 
result, when using a device with limited capabilities the 
access control mechanism may not be able to determine 
that the doctor is on duty resulting in limited access to the 
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record. In this situation, the doctor needs to understand 
why his access rights appear to change in an arbitrary 
way.   
The example illustrates that there is a relationship 
between the security requirement to maintain the integrity 
of the medical record and the granting/revoking of access 
rights. The doctor gets certain privileges when his 
contextual attributes say that he is on duty and gets a 
different set of privileges otherwise. In effect, the 
privileges the doctor gets are indirectly determined by the 
properties of the device he is using. As such if we know 
the properties of the device, at the time an access control 
decision is made, then we can determine which privileges 
the doctor gets. In this way we can relate the security 
requirement to a particular set of permitted privileges via 
device properties. This illustrates the role the context 
plays in relating requirements and security policies. We 
call such relationships traceability, a well-established 
concept in the software engineering literature. 
Traceability is generally defined as the ability to establish 
and keep track of the relationships between requirements, 
design artefacts, source code, test cases, etc [1][2].  Users 
of adaptive applications may not always have detailed 
knowledge on how security decisions are determined with 
respect to their context of use. This may lead to loss of 
confidence and trust in the adaptive application when its 
behaviour deviates from the user’s expectations. 
The main contribution of the paper is an approach to 
providing users of cloud applications information, 
explanations, and assurances about the security decisions 
made by an adaptive information security system. This 
enables the user to understand why a certain adaptation 
has occurred, how the adaptation is related to current 
context of use of the application, and steps they (users) 
may take to guarantee that the application satisfies its 
security requirements after an adaptation. Our approach is 
rooted in the well established concepts of entailment [3], 
traceability [4], and causality [5] as used in the software 
engineering literature.  
The entailment relationship is a framework that relates 
requirements, domain properties, and specification [3][6] 
of a software system. We use this framework for 
establishing traceability relationships relevant to adaptive 
information security systems and as a means of evaluating 
satisfaction of security requirements at runtime. Our 
traceability relationships are augmented with causality 
relations, namely, the effect of different actions or events 
on the state of the system. In our example, one can state 
the causality relation that the event of the doctor arriving 
at the hospital results in him being on duty and the event 
of him leaving the hospital results in him being off duty 
(i.e. not on duty). We enrich such causality relations with 
contextual attributes of the deployment environment as a 
means to providing information about the behaviour of an 
adaptive application to the user. Our proposed approach is 
demonstrated through an example of a cloud storage as-a-
service application. 
With the exception of Bencomo et. al. [7], as far as we 
are aware, we are the first to propose mechanisms for 
helping the user understand security decisions made by an 
adaptive application. While Bencomo et. al.’s approach to 
self-explanation in adaptive applications provides a 
general framework for explaining adaptive behaviour, in 
our approach we focus more on explaining security 
decisions, a task that requires additional treatment. For 
instance, the explanations must satisfy confidentiality 
requirements such that they are not exploitable by a 
potential attacker pretending to be the legitimate user. Our 
proposed rich traceability links help in making 
explanations more accurate to the user’s context, an 
important prerequisite for explaining security decisions.   
The paper is organized as follows: §2 presents an 
access control example we use to motivate and explain the 
problem we are solving. §3 presents background on 
concepts our approach builds on and notations we use. §4 
brings together the concepts and notations from §3 and 
show how we use them for representing traceability 
through an example. §5 describes algorithms we use for 
tracing security decisions using the traceability 
information from §4 and we evaluate and discuss the 
limitations of our approach in §6.  In §7 we review related 
literature and, finally, §8 concludes the paper and 
discusses pointers to further work. 
2. Motivating Example: An Adaptive 
Access Control Application 
Consider a hospital that uses a cloud-based electronic 
patient record (EPR) system. Bob is a doctor at the 
hospital and medical records of his patients are stored on 
the EPR system. The policy of the hospital is that Bob 
should only be able to access the medical records when he 
is on duty. Assuming that the EPR system has already 
authenticated Bob’s identity; whether he is on duty or not 
is based on a combination of three contextual attributes: 
his location, time of day, and the identity of the network he 
is using when accessing the medical records. We use the 
values of the attributes to determine the truth-value of a 
Boolean variable isOnDuty. However, the availability of 
these attributes will depend on Bob’s context when he 
attempts to access certain medical records.  Therefore we 
use the availability of the attributes to determine a 
confidence level for the computed truth-value.  
Because of variations in the features available in 
different devices Bob may use when accessing a medical 
record the confidence level on his on duty status varies. 
The confidence level can either be very low, low, medium, 
or high. The combination of the truth-value and confidence 
level is used to determine whether Bob is granted access to 
Read, Write, or Share the medical record. Adam is the 
policy administrator who specifies the policies that control 
the behavior of the EPR application.  One policy he 
specifies is that if the confidence level of isOnDuty is very 
low the user is not allowed to perform any of the 
operations. If it is low he can only read and if it is medium, 
he can Read and Write a medical record. If it is high he 
can perform Read, Write and Share operations.  
As a user Bob has limited knowledge on why the EPR 
system behaves in certain ways at runtime as his context of 
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use changes. Sometimes certain operations are permitted 
and sometimes they are denied. He only knows that when 
he is on duty the system should grant him full access rights 
on a medical record. He is not aware of the details of how 
the system determines that he is on duty, i.e., he does not 
know that his isOnDuty status depends on the three 
contextual variables.  
As a result of the lack of the detailed understanding of 
the implementation of the system’s adaptive behavior, Bob 
is sometimes confused about certain access control 
decisions. Bob wants a mechanism to help him understand 
why a certain adaptation has occurred and how the 
adaptation is related to the context in which he is using the 
system.  
For example if he is denied the privilege to share a 
medical record when using his laptop while the same 
privilege is available when using his iPad, the mechanism 
could explain why this is the case. When informing Bob, 
the mechanism could say that he is not able to share a 
record because “the system is not sure if you are on duty.” 
If Bob probes further for an explanation on why it is 
uncertain that he is on duty the mechanism would say “a 
GPS sensor is not available in the device you are using. As 
a result, the system is uncertain about your location and 
cannot determine if you are physically at the hospital 
premises. The security policy dictates that you should be at 
the hospital to share a medical record.”  
If Bob needs advice on how he can restore the sharing 
privilege then the assurance mechanism in the EPR 
system could advice Bob to “use the hosptal WiFi network 
to gain further privileges”. The explanatory messages 
given to Bob are specific to his context. In this case, the 
nature of the device he is using for access. 
Adam writes general policy rules that are instantiated 
for each user. He will not be able understand the specifics 
of each instance of the policy for each of the hundreds of 
users of the EPR system. Therefore Adam would benefit 
from a means of explaining specific security decisions and 
being assured that security requirements will be satisfied in 
specific contexts. By developing a way to relate security 
requirements, policies, and the EPR system’s contexts of 
use, we can provide the information, explanations and 
assurances needed by users and administrators like Bob 
and Adam.  
3. Background and Notations 
In supporting our approach to explaining adaptive security 
decisions we use Zave and Jackson’s entailment relation 
[8][9] and causality.  
3.1 The Entailment Relation  
Three sets of properties in Definition 1, namely the 
requirements R, the specifications S and the domain 
properties W are related.  
 
The set of requirements R describes the properties of 
the software system as desired by its users, customers, and 
other stakeholders. Requirements are optative descriptions 
in that they describe how the world would be once the 
envisioned system is in place. In the EPR system, there is 
a security requirement controlling access to medical 
records (MRS) that says: ‘The doctor can read, write, or 
share a patient’s medical record only when he is on duty 
depending on confidence level about his status of being on 
duty’. 
The set of domain properties W describes the 
behaviour of the context, which is the environment where 
the software system will be deployed. Attributes of the 
context have values that may determine the behaviour of 
the adaptive application. Unlike requirements, domain 
properties are indicative in that these properties hold both 
before and after the deployment of the software system. In 
the EPR example, an indicative property is: ‘Working 
hours at hospital are from 8am to 5pm.’   
The set of specifications* S describes how the 
computer should behave in order to satisfy the domain 
properties described in R, given that the domain 
properties in W hold. The specification for the MRS 
function could be: ‘After a successful authentication, the 
doctor can read, write, or share a patient’s medical 
record only when he is accessing the record within 
working hours’  
In general the problem-solution relationship between 
the three sets of descriptions explained above is given 
below. 
 
𝑊,𝑆   ⊢ 𝑅    
 
where ⊢ is the entailment operator. 
The entailment relation does not prescribe languages 
for expressing the three artefacts.  This has the advantage 
of giving the requirements engineers the freedom to 
choose a language of their choice for representing details 
of the three descriptions. In order to support the 
entailment we need to know the details about the specific 
behaviour of S and W. One way to describe the three 
artefacts (S, W, and R) is in terms of events and fluents.  
A requirements traceability link can be derived from 
explicit requirements problems in Definition 2.  
 
                                                
* For purposes of examples presented in this paper we regard 
specification to be equivalent to an access control policy and 
therefore use the two terms interchangeably. 
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The entailment relation can also be modelled 
graphically using the Problem Diagram notation [10]. 
Figure 1 shows a problem diagram modelling the medical 
record access control example.  
The machine to be designed is represented by the 
rectangle with double vertical lines. The medical record 
access control (ACM) is an example of a machine. 
Rectangles represent problem domains whose domain 
properties the machine rely in to satisfy the requirement. 
The medical record (MR) is an example of a problem 
domain. An access control specification for the ACM 
relies on properties of the medical record such as the 
ability of the record to be read or written. The access 
control requirement  to allow access when the doctor is on 
duty is represented as the dotted oval.  
 
 
Figure 1: Problem Diagram of the Medical Record Access 
Control Machine. 
 
The three entities in a problem diagram share 
phenomena between them through interfaces (see 
Definition 1). The solid lines a and b are machine 
interfaces. The dotted lines d and e are requirements 
interfaces. Dotted lines with an arrow (e.g. interface e) 
mean that the behaviour of the domain is constrained by 
the requirement. For example the ability of a medical 
record to be read, written, or shared is possible only if the 
doctor is on duty. Phenomena are either observed or 
controlled by one of the domains they link. For example, 
in interface a, the phenomena readable, writeable, and 
sharable are controlled by the ACM machine. This is 
denoted by the ‘!’ between the domain name and the 
phenomena. The MR domain observes these phenomena. 
The medical record access control machine (ACM) 
represents the software that must implement the security 
requirement and its behaviour is specified using access 
control policies. To satisfy the requirement, the ACM 
interfaces with the medical record (MR) and the user 
device (UD). The medical record is the asset to be secured 
by the ACM by controlling whether the doctor is able to 
read, write, or share it. The authenticated doctor (AD) 
interacts with the user device, through interface c, to issue 
request actions for access to a medical record. 
The truth-value and confidence level of the isOnDuty 
phenomena at interface d are computed by the ACM 
observing the phenomena isWithinGPSRange, 
isCorrectSSID, and isWithinWorkingHours at interface b. 
The phenomena isWithinGPSRange, isCorrectSSID, and 
isWithinWorkingHours are derived from sensors on the 
user device. 
3.2 Causal Relations 
The relationship between the events and state changes in 
domain descriptions can be described using causality 
relations. A causality relation is a way of describing how 
the occurrence of one event e1 leads to the occurrence of a 
second event e2 [5]. Event e2 can be either another event 
or the change of a fluent [11].  In this paper we are 
interested in two types of causality relations: direct and 
transitive causalities. We use the Event Calculus as a 
notation for representing and reasoning about causality. 
 
Direct and Transitive Causality 
 
Direct Causality: The occurrence of event e1 directly 
leads to the occurrence of event e2, expressed as causal 
relations, which can be generalised in Definition 3. 
 
 
 
For example, when the time of day becomes 8am, the 
event isWorkingHours follows. There is a direct causality 
relationship between ClockStrikes8am and 
isWorkingHours. Using Definition 3, this is expressed as: 
 
ClockStrikes8am ↪  isWorkingHours 
 
Note the effect of time in this causality relation. The 
events ClockStrikes8am and isWorkingHours do not 
happen simultaneously but they are consecutive. If event 
ClockStrikes8am happens at some time t0 then, according 
to Definition 3, isWorkingHours becomes true at a later 
time t1.  
 
Transitive Causality: Transitively, one may want to find a 
trace in Definition 4 as the evidence for their causality.  
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For example, when the time of day becomes 8am, 
Boolean variable isWorkingHours become true which 
leads to Boolean variables canRead, canWrite, and 
canShare becoming true. Using Definition 3 this can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
isWorkingHours ↪ canRead∧canWrite∧canShare 
 
There is a transitive relationship between 
ClockStrikes8am and the three events canRead, canWrite, 
and canShare. Using Definition 4 this can be expressed 
as: 
  
ClockStrikes8am ↪+ canRead∧canWrite,canShare 
  
Our use of these causality symbols in this paper has the 
same meaning as the casual relationships used for 
deriving specifications from requirements through 
problem reduction [11]. We use the Event Calculus (EC) 
as a formal language for representing causality. We chose 
the EC because: (1) it is expressiveness enough for 
representing the properties of causality that are of interest 
to the ideas presented in this paper; and (2) it has tool 
support for reasoning about causality. The next section 
gives a brief introduction to the EC. 
 
Event Calculus Representation 
 
The Event Calculus (EC) is a logic system for reasoning 
about how the occurrence of events changes the state of 
the world. We use the EC in this paper to express domain 
descriptions and to facilitate traceability. 
 
Basic Constructs of the Event Calculus: The EC consists 
of three basic sorts: events, fluents, and timepoints [12]. 
An event represents an action, which may occur to a 
problem domain. For example, ClockStrikes8am is an 
event in the medical record access control problem. A 
fluent is a time-varying property describing the state of a 
problem domain, such as isWorkingHours. A timepoint is 
a time instant, for example t0 denotes the timepoint 0.  
 
Event Calculus Predicates: A fluent is either true (holds) 
or false (does not hold) at a timepoint or over an interval. 
The occurrence of an event at a timepoint may change the 
truth value of a fluent. Below is the domain description of 
a clock used to tell time of day in the medical record 
access problem.  
Initiates (ClockStrikes8am, isWorkingHours, t)         [CD1] 
Terminates (ClockStrikes5pm, isWorkingHours, t)        [CD2] 
¬Initially (isWorkingHours)   [CD3] 
When an event results in a fluent being true it is said 
to initiate the fluent. For example the time of day event 
ClockStrikes8am results in fluent isWorkingHours being 
true. Hence ClockStrikes8am is said to initiate fluent 
isWorkingHours. If an event causes a fluent to become 
false then that event is said to terminate the fluent. For 
example, time of day event ClockStrikes5pm terminates 
isWorkingHours i.e. when event ClockStrikes5pm occurs 
isWorkingHours become false. These relationships 
between the events and fluents describe the behaviour of a 
clock, which we will use in the medical record access 
control problem.  
A domain description models a real-world domain and 
forms the basis for reasoning about the behaviour of the 
modelled domain. It is therefore important that its 
behaviour is consistent with the actual state of the real-
world problem domain. In the EC all reasoning about 
future states is based on current states. The initial state of 
a fluent f1 is expressed with Initially(f1) clauses. These 
state that fluent f1 holds at time 0. For example, the 
domain description assumes that the clock is initially set 
to a time that is not within working hours. (CD3). All 
other fluents not captured in the initially clause are 
assumed to be (initially) false and changes in their truth 
values are subject to the common sense law of inertia. 
This law states that a fluent remains false until initiated 
and remains true until terminated. Table 1 shows the 
predicates of the EC we will use and their meanings.  
 
Table 1 Event Calculus Predicates 
Fluent Description 
Initia te s (e ,f,t) Flue nt f s tar ts  to hold afte r  e ve nt e  a t 
t ime  t. 
T e rminate s (e ,f,t) Flue nt f ce as e s  to hold afte r  e ve nt e  a t 
t ime  t. 
Initia lly(f) Flue nt f holds  a t t ime  0  
Happe ns (e ,t) Eve nt e  occurs  a t t ime  t. 
Holds At(f,t) Flue nt f holds  a t t ime  t. 
Clippe d(t1 ,f,t2) Flue nt f is  te rminate d be twe e n time s  
t1  and t2 . 
 
Event Calculus Meta-Rules: Based on initial conditions, 
events that have happened, and rules that state how 
fluents are changed when events happen (domain 
descriptions), it is possible to determine which fluents 
hold. This is summarised in the EC rules below. 
 
Clipped(t1,f,t2) ß ∃a,t1 [ Happens(a,t) /\ Terminates(a, f, t1) /\ (t1<t<t2)]   [EC1] 
 
HoldsAt(f,t1) ß Initially(f) /\ ￢Clipped(0,f,t1)              [EC2] 
 
HoldsAt(f,t2) ß  Happens(a,t1) /\ Initiates(a,f,t1) /\ (t1 < t2) /\ ¬Clipped(t1,f,t2)   
      [EC3] 
 
EC1 states that if an event happens in the period 
between t1 and t2, and that event terminates fluent f 
during that period, the fluent is said to be clipped in the 
period. EC2 states that a fluent holds if it held initially 
and no event has occurred to stop it holding. EC3 captures 
the common sense law of inertia described above. These 
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three rules are referred to as meta-rules since they form 
the foundation of all reasoning about occurrence of events 
and resulting effects in the Event Calculus language. 
4. Traceability in Context 
 
As illustrated by our example, the traceability between 
requirements and policies can be established through the 
context. Sections 3 explained the concepts of entailment 
and causality and we now bring them together in this 
section to describe how traceability is established. We 
also illustrate causal relations in our example.  
 
4.1 Traceability Representation 
Policies and Requirements are expressed at different 
levels of abstraction using different forms of language. At 
a higher level of abstraction, requirements are expressed 
in terms of the conditions to be fulfilled by the 
application. Meanwhile at a lower level of abstraction, 
policies specify the actions that need to be performed by 
an application in order to make the conditions stated in 
the requirements true. The difference in the way the 
requirements and policies are expressed makes the task of 
relating them less obvious. 
Relating Problem and Solution Entities Through 
Context 
 
The entailment relation relates requirements (R), context 
(W), and specifications (S). Our approach leverages this 
representation to relate security requirements to policies. 
We assume that policies are in the solution space as their 
behaviour satisfies the requirements: in other words, we 
regard them as specifications. We can think about context 
as the traceability link between requirement and policy 
which we propose can be represented through the domain 
properties. Figure 2 presents the general framework of our 
approach. The figure shows how we propose to relate 
entities in the problem space to those in the solution space 
through facts in the context. Requirements and policies 
are in the problem and solution spaces, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2: Relating Requirements and Policies through 
Domain Assumptions in the Context 
 
We can think of the traceability link between 
requirements and policies in terms of the two links. The 
first link is between the problem and context domains – 
indicated by the dotted line between R and W in Figure 2. 
The second link is between the context and solution 
domain – indicated by the solid line between W and S. An 
interesting question is what specific attributes to consider 
in the requirement, context, and solution domains in order 
to establish these links. The next two sections address this 
question. 
 
Traceability Link Between Requirements and 
Context 
According to the entailment relation a requirement is 
defined as some property that must be exhibited by an 
application in order to solve some problem in the real 
world. For this reason we express a requirement in terms 
of the conditions we would like to be true in the context 
once the system is in place. The expression of a 
requirement references some attributes of the context. For 
example a requirement could say a doctor should have 
access to a medical record only when he is on duty. But 
what does being ‘on duty’ mean? We may say the doctor 
is on duty if he is within certain GPS coordinates, he is 
using the hospital WiFi for connection, and the time of 
day between 8am and 5pm. The explanation of what on 
duty means is derived from properties of the context.  
The example illustrates that the requirement contains 
references to domain assumptions in the context. It is 
through such references that we relate the requirement to 
the context. The relationship between the requirement and 
context is captured by traceability link L1 in Figure 3.  
 
 
X represents the attribute in the context that is 
referenced by the requirement. In our example ‘isOnDuty’ 
is a concept in the requirements, whereas GPS, WiFi, and 
Time-of-Day are attributes in the context. We can 
therefore distinguish between two types of the attribute x: 
x1 in the requirement and x2 in the context. x1 being the 
variable isOnDuty and x2 being the GPS, WiFi, and Time 
of Day. 
Using domain knowledge, the context (x2) qualifies 
what ‘isOnDuty’ (x1) means by stating how it is 
determined. Such reference provides a concrete 
relationship between the requirement and context thus 
forming a traceability link. 
Traceability Link Between Context and Policies 
Link L2 in Figure 4, represents a traceability link between 
the context and policies. Similar to entities in the problem 
space, solution space entities also make assumptions 
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about the behaviour of the context. The solution uses 
these assumptions to implement behaviour that satisfies 
the requirements. For instance the policies in our example 
implement access control mechanisms that determines 
who can or cannot access a medical record and the 
circumstances under which access should be granted or 
denied. Hence policies also references some attributes of 
the context. Again, we take advantage of these references 
to establish the traceability link between policies and 
context. 
 
 
In our example a policy could state that if a doctor is 
on duty then he should be allowed to read, write, and 
share a medical record. The policy assumes that some 
machinery is available for determining that the doctor is 
on duty or not. An example of such machinery is a 
location sensing equipment. In our example the location 
sensing is performed by a GPS component in the user 
device, which we assume the doctor carries with him. We 
use the reliance of the policy on properties of the context 
to establish a traceability relationship between the two.  
In our example, the value of y is the data that has been 
read from the GPS component that is interpreted through 
the context to determine if the doctor is on duty or not. 
The relationship between x and y established via the facts 
given in the context is the traceability link that relates the 
y in the policy to the x in the requirement. Worth noting 
in this example is that even though y is part of the policy 
it is not an action. It is a piece of data that qualifies the 
condition “isOnDuty” stated on the requirements side. 
Hence the traceability information on the policy side is 
not necessarily expressed as actions but can also be any 
fact that helps us qualify the conditions stated by the 
requirement. 
Required, Observed, and Designed Causality  
The distinction between requirements-to-context and 
context-to-specifications traceability links does not say 
anything about the boundary of the access control system. 
By separating events in the identified causality relations 
based on whether the event belongs to the machine, 
requirement or domain, it is possible to further enrich the 
traceability relations. There are three types of phenomena 
[10]: required, observed, and designed.  
It also follows that there are three types of causality 
events: (1) required causality; (2) observed causality; and 
(3) designed causality in Definition 5. 
 
Required Causality: These are causality events at the 
requirements interfaces d and e. The user will observe the 
phenomena that he can read, write, or share a medical 
record as a result of events initiated by the access control 
machine in changing the access rights on the medical 
record. Required causality is captured by link L1 in 
Figure 3. 
Observed Causality: These are events describing the 
behavior of a problem domain. The interaction between 
the doctor and the device, and the internal behaviour of 
the device that affects the phenomena 
isWithinWorkingHours, isWithinGPSRange, and 
isCorrectSSID are examples of observed causality. In 
Figure 1 interface c and any events internal to domains 
MR, UD, and AD are observed causality. 
Designed Causality: These are causality events at the 
machine interface. Such causality events are said to be 
‘designed’ because they come about as a result of 
behaviour of the machine specification. Machine 
interfaces a and b contain designed causality events. This 
corresponds to link L2 in Figure 4. 
 
Refining Traceability Links through Causality 
 
As stated earlier, when establishing traceability relations 
between requirements and policies we use causal links. 
However, there are important differences between 
traceability and causality links, which we explain in this 
section. Traceability links relate artifacts at different 
levels of abstraction. For example relating security 
requirements in the problem space to security policies in 
the solution space or relating a requirement to a section of 
source code that implements the requirement. On the 
other hand causal links relate events at the same level of 
abstraction such as the events that describe a domain. 
Definition 6 shows how causality can be used to refine the 
requirements traceability links. 
 
 
As an illustration, consider the GPS device for 
determining the doctor’s location. Its domain description 
could say: A GPS device gives its location in terms of 
latitude and longitude coordinates. In this statement 
latitude and longitude are numbers that, on their own, do 
not have any meaning. The description gives these 
numbers a meaning by stating they are a location. We can 
go further and enrich this description by stating that these 
coordinates are the location of the hospital. Similarly, 
‘location of the hospital’ would be meaningless unless we 
can say exactly what geometric reference system are we 
using to locate it. The links between the GPS coordinates 
and the location of the doctor are causal.  
The fact that location of the hospital is assigned to 
certain coordinates enables us to derive further facts such 
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as whether the doctor is “on-duty” or not. This is a 
traceability link as it relates the isOnDuty concept at the 
requirements level to contextual attributes (GPS 
coordinates, SSID, and time of day). Variables x and y are 
dependent on each other through causality. We exploit 
this dependency to define traceability within the context 
through domain descriptions. As stated earlier, x 
represents the Boolean variable “isOnDuty” while y 
represents the actual data that helps an access control 
machine to a medical record determine whether the value 
of isOnDuty should be true or false. In this case y is a 
combination of the GPS coordinates, WiFi SSID, and 
time-of-day.  
In summary, using causal links enriched with 
contextual information we are able to trace between 
entities in the problem space to entities in the solution 
space. We achieve this in two stages: (1) relating 
requirements to context; and (2) relating the context to 
policies. The relationship is established through facts in 
the context that are referenced by both the requirement 
and policy. Our approach assumes that the domain 
assumptions (facts) about the context already exist and we 
use these to establish the traceability relationship of 
requirements with policies. The domain assumptions are 
the relations between x and y in the context that binds a 
requirement to a corresponding policy. 
4.2. An Illustration of Causality 
The traceability links established through the entailment 
relation is not rich enough to support the process of 
tracing security decisions. In order to make the tracing 
process feasible we enrich the traceability links with 
additional contextual information on causality. After 
presenting an example of requirement, domain properties, 
and policies we discuss the type of contextual information 
needed for tracing access control decisions. 
 
Requirements, Policies, and Domain Properties  
 
The requirement, context, policy specifications from the 
architecture in Figure 2 and problem diagram in Figure 1 
can be instantiated through a refined version of the 
example presented in section 2 as follows: 
 
Requirements: 
• R: If the doctor isOnDuty then allow him to perform 
certain operations depending on the level of 
confidence of the determination of isOnDuty. 
Context:  
• W1: if the doctor is within hospital GPS 
coordinates, using hospital WiFi, and within 
working hour, then the doctor is on duty with high 
confidence level.  
[(latitude=X,longitude=Y)AND(8am<timeOfDay<5pm) AND 
(WiFiSSID=HospitalWiFi)]  ↪  
{isOnDuty=True,ConfidenceLevel=HIGH} 
• W2: if the doctor is not within hospital GPS 
coordinates, using hospital WiFi, and within 
working hours, then the doctor is on duty with 
medium confidence level.  
[(latitude!=X,longitude!=Y)AND(8am<timeOfDay<5pm)AND 
(WiFiSSID=HospitalWiFi)]  ↪  
{isOnDuty=True,ConfidenceLevel=MEDIUM} 
• W3: if the doctor is not within hospital GPS 
coordinates, using hospital WiFi, and not within 
working hours, then the doctor is on duty with low 
confidence level.  
[(latitude!=X,longitude!=Y)AND(8am>timeOfDay>5pm)AND 
(WiFiSSID=HospitalWiFi)]  ↪  
{isOnDuty=True,ConfidenceLevel=LOW} 
• W4: if the doctor is not within hospital GPS 
coordinates, not using hospital WiFi, and not within 
working hours, then the doctor is not on duty and 
level of confidence is very low.  
[(latitude!=X,longitude!=Y)AND(8am>timeOfDay>5pm)AND 
(WiFiSSID!=HospitalWiFi)]  ↪  
{isOnDuty=False,ConfidenceLevel=VERYLOW} 
Policies: 
• P1:  
if ((isDoctor(subject)=TRUE) AND  
    (confidenceLevel=HIGH) AND 
    (isOnDuty(subject)=TRUE)) then  
EnableRead() = True; 
EnableWrite() = True; 
EnableShare() = True; 
• P2:   
if ((isDoctor(subject)=TRUE) AND  
              (confidenceLevel=MEDIUM) AND 
              (isOnDuty(subject)=TRUE)) then 
EnableRead() = True; 
EnableWrite() = True; 
EnableShare() = False; 
• P3:  
if ((isDoctor(subject)=FALSE) OR  
               (isOnDuty=TRUE) OR  
               (confidenceLevel=LOW)) then 
EnableRead() = True; 
EnableWrite() = False; 
EnableShare() = False; 
• P4:  
if ((isDoctor(subject)=FALSE) OR  
               (isOnDuty=FALSE) OR  
               (confidenceLevel=VERYLOW)) then 
EnableRead() = False; 
EnableWrite() = False; 
EnableShare() = False; 
 
The requirement describes what is to be achieved by the 
access control machine. It states that if the doctor is on 
duty and based on confidence level about his on duty 
status then he will be able to perform certain operations 
on a medical record. The policies are more specific than 
the requirement as they state what access rights will be 
granted to the doctor under different contextual 
conditions. Both the requirement and policies refer to the 
isOnDuty and confidenceLevel variables but they do not 
say how these variables are to be determined. The context 
relates the conditions stated in the requirements to the 
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actions stated in the policies by showing how the entities 
referenced in both requirements and specifications are 
derived from contextual attributes. This provides a rich 
traceability between the requirements and policies. For 
instance, the domain knowledge provided by context is 
necessary in order to explain what ‘isOnDuty’ means in 
terms of causality for both the requirement and policy. 
Therefore, we need to make the context explicit as a way 
of linking requirements to their policies. 
 
Causality Links, Logs, Domain Assumptions 
 
In order to provide information, explanations and 
assurance to the user, we collect three types of 
information: causality links, data logs, and domain 
assumptions. Using our running example we illustrate the 
nature of these pieces of information. 
  
Causality Links: The value of the Boolean variable 
isOnDuty and its confidenceLevel is determined by a 
combination of the values of three contextual variables 
GPS, WiFi, and TimeOfDay with varying levels of 
confidence for each combination as shown in Table 2. 
The confidence level can be VeryLow, Low, Medium, or 
High. The confidence level indicates the trust we have in 
the truth-value of the isOnDuty variable. This reflects the 
uncertainity we may have on the context.  
The confidence in the isOnDuty variable depends of 
which sensors are available. For example, according to 
Table 2, if the GPS sensor is providing accurate 
coordinates and the doctor is connected to the hospital 
WiFi but not during working hours the confidence level is 
assign to HIGH. However, if none of the three sensors are 
available confidence level is assigned VERYLOW. Note 
that the ratings in Table 2 about confidence level would 
typically be formulated with the help of a domain expert. 
We convert the data in Table 2 into the EC causality links 
shown in Listing 1.  
 
Table 2: Variable Confidence Determination from 
Context Variable Values 
isWithin-
GPSRange 
isCorrect-
SSID 
isWorking-
Hours 
isOnDuty Confidence 
Level 
0 0 0 F VERYLOW 
0 0 1 T LOW 
0 1 0 T LOW 
0 1 1 T MEDIUM 
1 0 0 T MEDIUM 
1 0 1 T HIGH 
1 1 0 T HIGH 
1 1 1 T HIGH 
0 à False / 1 à True 
 
The levels of confidence are mapped to three 
operations on a medical record: Read, Write, and Share as 
shown in Table 2. If the confidence level is very low the 
doctor is not allowed to perform any of the three actions. 
If the confidence level is low, the doctor is allowed to 
read medical record. If the confidence level is medium, he 
can only Read and Write a medical record. If the 
confidence level is high, he can perform all the 
operations. 
 
Listing 1: isOnDuty Variable Causality Links 
 
1.1 (!HoldAt(IsWithinGPSRange(),time) 
&!HoldAt(IsCorrectSSID(),time)&!HoldAt(IsWorkingHours(), 
time)) ↔ Happens(E1(),time). 
1.2 Terminates(E1(), IsOnDuty, time). 
1.3 (HoldsAt(IsWithinGPSRange(),time) | 
HoldsAt(IsCorrectSSID(),time) | HoldsAt(IsWorkingHours(),time)) 
↔ Happens(E2(), time). 
1.4 Initiates(E2(), IsOnDuty, time). 
 
Listing 2: Confidence Level Causality Links 
 
2.1 Initiates (E1(), VeryLowConfidenceLevel(), time). 
2.2 HoldsAt(IsWithinGPSRange(),time)&(HoldsAt(IsCorrectSSID(),time)  
     ⊕ HoldsAt(IsWorkingHours(),time))↔HappensAt(E2(),time). 
2.3 Initiates(E2(), LowConfidenceLevel(), time). 
2.4 HoldsAt(IsWithinGPSRange(),time)⊕HoldsAt(IsCorrectSSID(),time)  
      ⊕ HoldsAt(IsWorkingHours(),time)↔Happens(E3(),time). 
2.5 Initiates(E3(), MediumConfidenceLevel(),time). 
2.6 HoldsAt(IsWithinRange(),time)&(HoldsAt(IsCorrectSSID(),time)|  
      HoldsAt(IsWorkingHours(),time)↔Happens(E4(),time). 
2.7 Initiates(E4(), HighConfidenceLevel(), time). 
 
WHERE ⊕ is the XOR logical operator 
 
Table 3: Matching Confidence Level to Operations 
Confidence Level Operations/Rights 
 CanRead CanWrite CanShare 
VERYLOW 0 0 0 
LOW 1 0 0 
MEDIUM 1 1 0 
HIGH 1 1 1 
0 à Operation Not Allowed / 1 à Operation Allowed 
 
Listing 3: Access Rights Causality Links 
3.1 Happens(CanRead(), time) →  
      !HoldsAt(VeryLowConfidenceLevel(),  time). 
3.2 Happens(CanWrite(), time) →  
      HoldsAt(MediumConfidenceLevel(),time)&    
      HoldsAt(HighConfidenceLevel(),time). 
3.3 Happens(CanShare(), time) →  
      HoldsAt(HighConfidenceLevel(),  time). 
 
The encoding of the data in the tables to EC is done by 
taking the input of the tables as the ‘causing’ event and 
the output of the table as the effect. For example in Table 
2 the states of the three sensors are the inputs and the 
outputs are isOnDuty and confidence level. The first row 
in Table 2 says that if all three sensors are not available 
then isOnDuty is false and the confidence level is very 
low. To encode this condition in EC we first define e1 -  
an event that gets triggered when all sensors are not 
available. As long as the conjunction of the inputs 
indicated in row 1  (all sensors not available) is true then 
the event e1 keeps happening. The occurrence of e1 is 
indicated by 1.1 in Listing 1 and 1.2 says that the 
occurrence of event e1 results in isOnDuty being false. In 
Listing 2, 2.1 says that the occurrence of e1 initiates the 
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fluent LowConfidenceLevel. The rest of the rows in the 
tables are encoded in a similar way. 
Tables 1 and 2 are relatively easier to read compared 
to their EC translations in Listings 1 and 2, respectively. 
Although this is the case we still have to do the encoding 
into causality links because they (causality links) are more 
amenable to automated reasoning with some of the 
existing tools of the EC. 
 
Data Logs: In our approach, values of contextual 
attributes and policy decisions made are logged at 
runtime. A log of contextual attributes records the state of 
availability of the three sensors at a particular time 
instant. Policy decisions log is a record of which access 
rights were granted or denied at a given time instant. 
 
Table 4: Policy Decisions Data Log 
TimeStamp Access Rights Granted 
CanRead CanWrite CanShare 
13:45:21 0 0 0 
16:09:21 1 1 0 
18:33:21 1 1 1 
20:57:21 0 1 0 
23:21:21 1 0 0 
25:45:21 0 1 1 
28:09:21 1 1 1 
30:33:21 1 1 1 
32:57:21 0 0 0 
35:21:21 0 0 0 
37:45:21 0 1 1 
40:09:21 0 1 1 
42:33:21 1 0 0 
44:57:21 1 0 1 
……. …… …… …… 
0 à Operation Allowed / 1 à Operation Not Allowed 
 
Table 5: Contextual Attributes State Data Log 
 
Time Stamp 
Contextual Attributes 
isWithinGP
S Range 
isCorrect 
SSID 
isWorking 
Hours 
13:45:21 0 0 0 
16:09:21 0 1 1 
18:33:21 1 1 1 
20:57:21 1 1 1 
23:21:21 1 1 1 
25:45:21 0 0 1 
28:09:21 0 0 1 
30:33:21 0 1 0 
32:57:21 0 1 0 
35:21:21 0 1 1 
37:45:21 0 1 1 
40:09:21 1 0 0 
44:57:21 1 0 1 
………. …………. ……….. ………. 
0 à False / 1 à True 
 
Policy Decisions: When a policy decision is made either 
to permit or deny certain access rights we log this 
information in a policy decisions table. Table 4 is an 
example of a policy decisions table. According to this 
table at 16:09:21 the doctor was given the permission to 
Read and Write a medical record but was not allowed to 
share it. 
 
Contextual Attributes: The log of contextual attributes 
keeps information about sensors that were available at 
different times. In our example the contextual attribute 
values are the state of the three sensors which can be used 
in determining the value of the isOnDuty variable and its 
confidence level. A sample sensor data log table is shown 
in Table 5. According to this table at 16:09:21 the GPS 
coordinates indicate that the doctor was in the hospital 
and he was also connected to hospital WiFi. But the time 
of day was not working hours. 
 
Domain Assumptions: These are conditions that are 
assumed to be true for the relationship between W, S, and 
R in the entailment relationship to hold. The argument 
that the entailment relation holds depends on domain 
assumptions. These assumptions are assumed to be 
correct for the correct functioning of the machine 
specified by the behaviour in S because their control is 
not within the power of the machine. The assumptions in 
our example are as follows:  
 
A1: The GPS device is well calibrated to give a correct and valid 
reading about the location of the doctor.  
A2: The doctors always carry the GPS device.  
A3: The hospital WiFi has a unique identifier, which makes it possible 
to uniquely identify it among other WiFi networks.  
A4: The authentication device reads the doctor’s credentials correctly.  
A5: The file system where the medical record is kept has features for 
reading, writing, and sharing operations. 
A6: The clock is set to the correct time of the day corresponding to its 
time zone 
A7: The WiFi router has a unique serial number that enables the 
access control machine to verify that it is indeed the one that belongs to 
the hospital. 
 In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   illustrate	   how	   we	   use	   the	  causality	   links,	   data	   logs,	   and	   domain	   assumption	   to	  derive	   information	   for	   informing,	   explaining,	   and	  assuring	   the	   user	   about	   access	   control	   decisions	   at	  runtime.	  
5. Tracing Policy Decisions to Security 
Requirements 
The tracing process includes three related processes for 
tracing policy decisions to security requirements, namely, 
informing, explaining, and assuring. Our approach 
includes a set of algorithms that take the different types of 
contextual data collected in section 4 to trace security 
decisions.  
Starting with the denial of the security requirement rs, 
at time t0, a user u (e.g., Bob) wants to understand what's 
happening. The process includes three kinds of answers in 
different level of details. Firstly, the informing step (see 
Algorithm 1) classifies the traces into two categories, WR 
and W!R, depending on whether security requirement can 
or cannot be satisfied by these contexts. Using the causal 
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traceability between the current policies s and the security 
requirement rs.  
 
 
There are many possible ways to solve this 
classification problem, e.g., by using the inductive 
learning procedure for deterministic classification, or 
using the statistical machine learning on supervised 
dataset for probabilistic classification. The informing 
contexts may help narrow the scope of search in the 
following explaining step. 
For example, according to Table 3, if confidence level 
is LOW, one might not be able to READ, WRITE or 
SHARE the document. Using Table 3, the LOW 
confidence level is further traced to three possible 
situations for the three contextual variables 
(isWithinRangeGPS, isCorrectSSID, isWorkingHours): 
(0, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 0). Note that both cases 
isWithinRangeGPS is false, which indicates that W!R = 
!isWithinRangeGPS and either !isCorrectSSID or 
!isWorkingHour. In fact, because !isWithinRangeGPS is 
false in both cases, it is more informative to tell user 
whether isCorrectSSID or isWorkingHour is true or false. 
After knowing which contexts W!R may cause problems in 
satisfying rs the system further fetches from the user the 
relevant domain properties Wu(t0) at the time t0 from the 
data log, see Algorithm 2. 
 
For example, by the time when all the permissions are 
denied in Table 4, i.e., 35h21m21s, the corresponding 
context domain properties in Table 5 concerning user 
"Bob" before that (at 32h57m21s) was !isCorrectSSID 
and isWorkingHour. Therefore, it is more informative to 
the user about the denial of access. 
Knowing the situation, the user could react by 
changing his or her contexts in the next timestamp t1. This 
leads to the new context relevant to the change Wu(t1). To 
provide assurance that it is possible to satisfy the security 
requirement rs in the new context w1, the system relies on 
a reasoning tool that evaluates the entailment relation.  
 
 
For example, we can use an event calculus reasoning 
tool to compute the abduction of the event sequences that 
may lead to this.  
6. Evaluation and Discussion 
The data collected in Section 4 helps us inform and 
explain adaptive behaviour as well as give assurance that 
their requirements are still being satisfied after an 
adaptation. The difference between informing and 
explaining is in the level of information provided. 
Informing tells the user why a particular access control 
decision has been taken. Meanwhile, explaining tries 
justifies the security decision by giving the reasons why it 
was denied with reference to the context of the user. 
Finally, assurance tells the user steps they can take to 
rectify the problem.  We explain how each of these 
functions is fulfilled using the algorithms from Section 5 
through an evaluation of hypothetical scenarios from the 
access control example presented in Section 2.  We also 
discuss some of the limitations of our approach.  
 
6.1 Evaluation 
 
Informing: Recall in the motivating example that Bob 
has two devices: a laptop and an iPad. He always uses his 
iPad when accessing medical record in the hospital 
because it is portable to carry while attending to patients. 
The iPad has all three sensors GPS, WiFi, and a clock as a 
result Bob always get full access rights on medical 
records using his iPad. Due to a malfunction on his iPad 
Bob decides to use his laptop instead. On his laptop he is 
not able to share medical records with his fellow doctors. 
The access time is 16:09:21. He is not sure why this is the 
case.  
The causality links in Listing 3 suggest that the 
sharing right is revoked if confidence level is VeryLow, 
Low, or Medium. This information is derived from 
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causality link 3.3, which says that it is only possible to 
share a medical record when confidence level is high.  
From the three causality links the doctor can be 
informed that the reason he is being denied sharing a 
record:  
“You are not able to share the record because the system 
is not sure that you are on duty.” 
 
Explaining: As shown above, there are three possible 
reasons why Bob is being denied the right to share a 
record. To narrow down to the exact reason we look at the 
time the access control decision was taken and identity 
what was the state of the sensors at that time. According 
to Table 5 at 16:09:21 Bob was using the hospital WiFi, 
accessing the record within working hours, but was not 
within hospital premises according to his GPS device. 
According to 2.4 in Listing 2 this combination of sensors 
result into a MediumConfidenceLevel about his isOnDuty 
status.  
 
This contextual attribute results in an event e3 whose 
occurrence makes confidence level to be medium.  
 
2.4 HoldsAt(isWithinGPSRange,t)⊕HoldsAt(isCorrectSSID,t)⊕  
      HoldsAt(isWorkingHours,t)↔HappensAt(e3,t) 
2.5 Initiates(e3, MediumConfidenceLevel,t) 
 
Hence, an explanation message to the doctor could be 
something like:  
 
“You are not allowed to share this medical record 
because you are currently not within hospital premises.” 
 
Using a combination of causality links and log data 
accurate information can be provided to the user on why a 
particular access control decision has been taken. When 
tracing a policy decision that involves a fluent being made 
false we inspect all terminates causality links involving 
the fluent. This helps in identifying all the possible 
events/causes that can make the fluent false. Similarly, 
when tracing why a fluent is true we inspect all the 
initiates causality links involving the fluent and identify 
all the events that make it true.  
When there are multiple possibilities of events/causes 
log data is used to identify the time at which a policy 
decision was made and link this to the status of contextual 
attributes at the time. This eliminates causality links that 
do not apply and provides a more precise explanation of 
the security adaptation performed by the system.  
 
Assurance: The traceability links can also be used to 
derive information on what steps the user can take to 
change the outcome of the behaviour of the adaptive 
application and in particular restore satisfaction of the 
requirement. The user may be interested to know what he 
needs to do for the application to grant certain access 
rights which are currently being denied or vice versa. In 
our example Bob wants to be advised on what he needs to 
do in order to regain the rights to share medical records. 
Through the traceability links we have established that 
Bob is unable to share medical records because he is not 
in the right context, that is, he currently not within 
hospital premises according to his GPS device. To remedy 
this situation the system can advice Bob to change his 
context by relocating to the hospital. The assurance 
mechanism also needs to advice Bob to make sure that 
relevant domain assumptions are valid. For example, he 
needs to make sure that while changing location to the 
hospital he is still carrying (A2) a well calibrated GPS 
device (A1). 
Changing context triggers an adaptive application to 
change its behaviour by invoking policies appropriate for 
the context. For adaptive applications for information 
security the user may be interested in the question of 
whether the application still satisfies its requirements after 
an adaptation. The traceability links are based on the 
entailment relationship. By (re-) evaluating the entailment 
relationship we can provide assurance that the 
applications still satisfies its requirements after an 
adaptation. 
While the analysis and refinement of policies can 
ensure that policies correctly implement behavior that 
satisfies the user’s security requirements, the highly 
dynamic contexts in which cloud services are used mean 
that their policies might not capture all possible security 
threats. To ensure that the adaptive application can detect 
when its security requirements are no longer being 
satisfied at runtime our approach includes requirements 
satisfaction information as part of the traceability links. 
Using the entailment relation, we can express the 
relationship between the requirements, context, and 
policies as Ws, Ss |- Rs. This states that the behavior of the 
policy Ss satisfies the requirement Rs given that some 
assumptions about the context Ws holds.  
In our running example the security requirement is 
satisfied if the doctor supplies his credentials, a GPS 
device (carried by the doctor) supplies the correct location 
of the doctor, he is connected to the office WiFi, and the 
policy Ps behaves according to its specification. Provided 
the doctor has supplied valid credentials, his location 
according to the GPS device is such that he is within the 
premises of the hospital (i.e. he is on-site), then he should 
be allowed to read, write, and share the patients’ medical 
record. Otherwise access must be denied. The argument 
that the security requirement will be satisfied is the 
satisfaction argument. 
For our medical record access control problem, the 
satisfaction argument can informally and generally stated 
as follows: 
 
“If the doctor supplies valid credentials, the doctor is 
carrying a GPS device, the coordinates from the GPS 
device are valid and say that the his location is within the 
premises of the hospital, he is accessing through hospital 
WiFi, the time of the day falls within working hours, then 
allow him to read, write, and share a medical record. 
Also allow the user to read, write, and share a medical 
record if he authenticates himself with credentials for an 
emergency procedure. Otherwise deny the access.” 
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If the above argument is correct we can say that the 
security requirement is satisfied. The correctness or 
validity of the argument depends on a number of 
assumptions we make about the context and ACM 
machine. The assumptions are stated in Section 4. 
 
6.2 Discussion 
 
Currently, our reasoning system is implemented on the 
Event Calculus reasoning tool where the rules are 
encoded systematically from the domain properties 
established from the monitors implemented and deployed 
on the target system. The general procedure proposed in 
Algorithm 1 needs to be made more efficient at runtime if 
the domain knowledge is to be exploited for the adaptive 
systems.  
For example, the Informing step can be made more 
efficient by incrementally developing the causal 
relationships, or by statistical classifications. Incremental 
update of the data or knowledge structures is feasible 
because the changes to the physical contextual situations 
of a given user usually have some degree of continuity. In 
addition, when the size of the data log may be 
accumulated to exceed the capacity, it is possible to 
discard the earliest data logs as long as the learned 
classification structures are kept. However, statistical 
classification requires some training and collecting 
additional logs may help improve the accuracy.  
The Explaining procedure may be enhanced further by 
preprocessing and customizing the contexts for individual 
users’ attributes. For example as Bob’s normal office 
locations are known beforehand, we can save the memory 
consumption for the domain properties and relationships. 
For example, condensing the consequent events that are in 
fact causing no changes to the fluents would not cause 
any loss to the capability of reasoning about the abnormal 
events. Therefore, providing abstract events to summarize 
these similar concrete events through a preprocessing step 
can help with the scalability of the reasoning algorithm. 
The information presented by Tables 2 and 3 
demonstrate a significant concept in the philosophy of our 
proposed approach to traceability. It demonstrates that in 
establishing traceability we need refinement in problem, 
context, and solution spaces. In the problem space, the 
requirement about Boolean variable isOnDuty has been 
refined to different confidence levels: VeryLow, Low, 
Medium, and High. The context has been refined to three 
variables isWithinGPSRange, isWithinWorkingHours, 
and isCorrectSSID. In the solution space the action of 
access to a medical record has been refined to operations 
for reading, writing, and sharing a medical record. 
Causality links are then established by relating the 
phenomena in each of the three (problem, context, and 
solution) sets of descriptions. It is these causality links 
that makes traceability from requirements to policies 
possible. 
 
7. Related Work 
The novelty of our work is in the use of rich traceability 
for self-explanation of security decisions in adaptive 
systems. We review the key related literature in these 
areas and compare with our work. 
 
Self-Explanation and Diagnosis: With notable 
exceptions, such as Bencomo et. al.[7], we are not aware 
of any other approach to providing mechanisms for self-
explaining the behaviour of an adaptive system to the 
user. While Bencomo et. el. propose a general approach to 
explaining emergent behaviour in adaptive systems, our 
approach focuses on explaining security decisions in 
adaptive systems. The focus on explaining security 
decisions brings with it several additional challenges. One 
of these challenges is that we need to make explicit the 
assets to be protected and make the explanations precise 
to the context of the user. For confidentiality reasons we 
also need to be careful about the content of our 
explanations to ensure that the system does not 
unnecessarily reveal information that may aid a potential 
attacker in breaching security. In order to address these 
challenges our approach uses traceability enriched with 
causality as a mechanism for establishing and reasoning 
about the relationship between requirements and policies 
to help understand system behaviour. 
Our use of traceability as a tool to explain adaptation 
decision has similarities with the works on requirements 
monitoring [13], fault diagnosis [14], and root cause 
analysis [15]. Our approach to informing, explaining, and 
assuring is motivated by techniques developed from these 
areas of research. While these approaches are mainly 
designed for explaining why a particular fault, problem or 
emergent behaviour occurs, our approached goes a step 
further by providing assurance that a requirement is still 
being satisfied after an adaptation and suggesting ways in 
which requirements satisfaction can be restored.  
 
Traceability Representation: Traditionally, traceability 
has been used as tool for supporting software maintenance 
activities [16][17][18][19]. In this tradition use of 
traceability, traceability links connect information 
contained between the artifacts being traced [20]. The 
links are often based on common keywords [18] between 
artifacts or numbering systems, such as requirement 
traceability matrixes [21][22], which are used to associate 
one artifact with another. While these links are effective 
in maintaining general explicit relationships between 
artefacts, they do not contain adequate semantic 
information that can be used for reasoning about the 
relationship between requirements (problems) and 
policies (solutions). For example, when using existing 
traceability links it is not possible to reason about whether 
a requirement is still satisfied by a given policy after a 
change in context. As our links are based on the 
entailment relation we are able to reason about 
requirements satisfaction using satisfaction arguments 
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[23][24]. The links we proposed can also be generalized 
into traceability rules in the same style as the requirement-
to-object-model rules [25]. 
Attempts have been made to establish semantically 
rich traceability links [26][27]. However such links are 
not sufficient for explaining adaptive system behaviour. 
The links we have proposed in this paper involve 
capturing domain-specific and intrinsic information 
relating security requirements to policies through 
causality [11][5]. This representation of links has been 
motivated by the observations that security requirements 
are stated in terms of the conditions that need to be true to 
protect assets from harm, and security policies are 
expressed in terms of the actions that need to be 
performed in order to satisfy the conditions stated by 
security requirements [6][28]. Based on these 
observations we specify traceability links in terms of 
causality relationships between conditions stated in the 
requirements and the actions expressed in policies. This 
provides richer traceability links.  
The problem of relating a security requirement, to 
policies, and the contextual conditions in which those 
policies should be enforced is similar to the traceability 
problem in software product lines [29][30][31]. While for 
software product lines traceability is about how to relate 
the various documents produced for the different product 
variants, our approach for traceability in adaptive 
applications involves explicitly exposing the contextual 
conditions that an application depends on as part of the 
traceability between the requirements and policies. 
Explicit expression of the contextual conditions/attributes 
in traceability links is useful for adaptive applications as it 
helps in reasoning and deriving explanation of adaptive 
behaviour.  
Our representation of traceability links with 
entailment relations is similar to the idea of knowledge 
representation for self-adaptive system behaviour [32]. 
Reasoning on the knowledge is used to establish 
connection between knowledge, perception, and actions 
that realize self-adaptive behaviour. Their approach aims 
at logging execution traces so that the adaptive system can 
remember where it failed. Our approach is aimed at 
reasoning on the model representation of an adaptive 
system in order to explain its behaviour to the user. We 
are not the first to use the Event Calculus for representing 
and reasoning about causality. Galton [33] used the EC in 
causal reasoning for alert generation in smart homes. In 
our approach we use the EC in a similar way – as 
formalism for handling the manner in which certain 
conjunctions of independent states (such as readings from 
sensors) can be used as trigger of dependent states.  
 Bruni et. al. [34] proposed a causality framework for 
allocating new events and relating their causes. They 
achieve this by modelling relationship between processes 
and causal relations among the processes’ events.  Their 
cause-effect relation approach can be useful in future 
development of our approach to establish previously 
undefined causality relations. The causality relations we 
use in our approach are predefined. The dynamic 
definition of the causality relations can make the goal of 
run-time traceability more feasible. 
For software maintenance bi-directional 
transformations [35] have been proposed as a means to 
establishing and maintaining traceability [36]. With these 
transformations separate traceability links are required for 
forward and reverse traces.  With our approach a single 
traceability link can be used for both forward and reverse 
trace tasks. This is made possible by the fact that our 
traceability links contain references to entities in the 
requirements, context, and policies. The satisfaction 
arguments [23] explicitly relate the requirements to the 
policies through domain assumptions in context. In this 
way regardless of what changes occur in the context, the 
relationship between the requirements and policies is 
maintained. Our approach also has the potential to allow 
for a ‘live’ validation of this relationship by providing the 
capability of re-evaluating entailment relationships at run-
time. 
8. Conclusions and Further Work 
Information security for applications used in varying 
contexts need to be adaptive in order maintain satisfaction 
of security requirements. With such adaptive information 
security the applications need to give assurance about the 
security requirements they are satisfying as well as 
information about and explanation of the access control 
decisions taken at runtime. We proposed traceability as a 
mechanism for enabling adaptive applications to provide 
information, explanations, and assurance about access 
control decision taken at runtime. We used traceability as a 
way of understanding the relationship between security 
requirements and the policies that enforce those 
requirements. Our traceability links are rooted entailment 
relations – capturing the links with causal relationships 
described in domain descriptions. Through our traceability 
links we were able to explain the rationale for access 
control decisions and reason what access control decisions 
would result from a change in contextual attributes at 
runtime.  
We plan to investigate how traceability can be further 
improved for better self-explanation. In particular, the 
content of the messages given by our approach for helping 
the user understand adaptive behavior needs to be crafted 
with great caution. We believe that traceability can be used 
as a mechanism for scoping policies to be selected for 
adaptation to a context that was not completely understood 
at the design time. The feasibility of this idea is being 
investigated. We plan to capture the runtime event traces 
of an access control application and map each event in a 
trace to its effect using causality information. By so doing 
we hope to identify abnormal behavior that leads to the 
violation of a security requirement. Using supervised 
learning mechanisms [37] the adaptive application may 
then be trained on new behaviors that can be applied to 
either weaken the requirement or strengthen it to prevent 
further violation. We may use techniques such as inductive 
learning procedures [38] to generate explanations of how 
the system may be changed to comply with user requests.  
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